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3Section One: Introduction
Why do state decision-makers expend considerable diplomatic and material resources to 
help alleviate some humanitarian crises, while other crises fail to attract similar levels of 
attention? How can we explain why some humanitarian issues are selected for attention 
by transnational advocacy networks (TANs) over others? The answers to these questions 
are of critical societal importance in helping to prevent or mitigate the suffering of victims 
of war, human rights abuses, famine, and natural disasters, among other humanitarian 
issues. These questions also speak to an important scholarly debate and potential 
site of theoretical and empirical innovation in the international relations (IR) literature 
concerning the emergence of issues and norms in international politics.
This study will advance a political psychology approach to the question of when and 
why some humanitarian issues are prioritized in international politics over others. It will 
empirically test the proposition that the cognitive perception1 of issues by key actors is 
a central determinant in the adoption and non-adoption of humanitarian issues by TANs 
and state decision-makers. Existing scholarship suggests that issue characteristics are 
a primary explanatory factor in whether humanitarian causes will galvanize international 
support (Stone 1989; Keck and Sikkink 1999). Issues which fit well with pre-existing 
national and international agendas, resonate with transnational norms, or exude a simple 
causal chain of blame, such as those pertaining to bodily harm and legal ill-treatment 
of innocent or vulnerable people, are said to be more likely to be met favourably by 
transnational actors and governments (Keck and Sikkink 1999, pp. 98-99). Indeed, 
Carpenter et al.’s (2014) focus group research involving human rights practitioners 
found that issue characteristics, as well as intra-network relations, were the most 
frequently cited factors in determining issue adoption by humanitarian organizations. 
However, Carpenter’s (2007) comparative study of network advocacy on the issues of 
child soldiers, girls in war, and children born as a result of wartime rape, demonstrates 
that the prioritization and mobilization of international support for humanitarian 
issues is inexplicable in terms of the issue characteristics which Keck and Sikkink 
identify. Therefore, variation in the issues which are selected for attention by state and 
transnational actors cannot be accounted for through existing explanatory frameworks. 
1 There is some disagreement in the cognitive psychology literature concerning the level of interrelation 
between human cognition and perception, and how these concepts may be demarcated (for a summative 
analysis of this debate see: Firestone and Scholl 2015). While acknowledging this interrelationship, in this 
study the term cognitive perception (as distinct from sensory perception) is specifically used to refer to the 
mental mechanisms of information processing, reasoning, application of knowledge, memory, and problem-
solving which become operative once new information has initially undergone sensory perception.
4The principal insight which will be developed and tested in this study is that it is the 
cognitive perception of humanitarian issues by key state and transnational actors, rather 
than the constitutive nature of the issues themselves, which may help to explain variation 
in issue adoption. This discussion leads to the following research question:
Research Question: Why do individual decision-makers prioritize some humanitarian 
issues over others in international politics?
This research project will address the above question in a theoretically and 
methodologically innovative way. First, the study will be novel in its political psychology 
approach, deriving hypotheses from an interdisciplinary integration of theoretical insights 
from the international relations and cognitive psychology literatures. Given that existing 
explanations of the proposal’s central question focus on the constitutive character of 
humanitarian issues, and thus potentially neglect an important intervening factor in 
terms of the perception of these issues by TAN and state decision-makers, a political 
psychology approach appears pertinent. Second, in a field where qualitative research, 
as well as large-N quantitative research, is common this study will be methodologically 
innovative, with the aforementioned hypotheses being tested through employing a mixed-
method design incorporating experimental and qualitative components. This approach 
will help to shed light on the individual cognitive processes which underlie responses to 
humanitarian issues.
While various factors may affect decision-making processes regarding humanitarian 
issues, such as the characteristics of the political or organizational body undertaking 
the decision, intra-network dynamics, informational and material resources, public and 
international opinion, geo-political concerns, and feasibility of assistance, among others, 
in the first instance the nature and urgency of respective humanitarian issues must be 
perceived and interpreted by key individual actors (Zhang et al. 2002; Cosgrave 1996). 
It is this initial step in the decision-making process on humanitarian issues, an inherent 
precursor to the aforementioned factors, which shall be the focus of this study.
5Significance of the Study
Extending from this focus, the findings of this research project will have implications  
well beyond the psychology of the individual. The study aims not only to shed light on  
why TANs and state decision-makers may prioritize some humanitarian issues over 
others, but will possess a more generalizable utility for scholars seeking to understand 
the role of psychological processes in political, organizational, and network-based 
decision-making. Moreover, gaining an understanding of the manner in which the 
cognitive perception of issues affects issue selection by TANs and state decision-makers 
may also provide useful insights for scholars engaged in on-going debates concerning 
the role of media effects in political judgement formation in respect of humanitarian 
issues (see: Jakobsen 1996; Livingston 1997; Robinson 2000). Furthermore, the proposed 
project aims to contribute to a broader debate concerning why issues and norms emerge 
in international politics. Failure to provide a convincing account of issue and norm 
emergence is a criticism which has typically been levelled at constructivist international 
relations scholars, a research agenda which may be fruitfully augmented through 
investigation at the individual level of analysis using insights from cognitive psychology 
(see: Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Section Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
As a prerequisite to examining the project’s research question its key concepts  
require delimitation. First, TANs shall be defined as distinct non-state actors  
“...working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a 
common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck and  
Sikkink 1999, p. 89). Practically speaking, TANs may include domestic and international 
NGOs, intellectuals, UN bodies, and “Gatekeeper” human rights and crisis groups such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Bob 2005). Second, for the purposes 
of this study individual decision-makers shall be taken to refer to decision-makers 
at the executive level of national governments, as well as the central individual and 
organizational representatives of TANs. More specifically, in respect of state  
decision-makers, individual decision-makers alludes to state leaders, government 
ministers with competencies for foreign affairs, and executive advisors. Finally, 
6the concept of humanitarian issues may encompass quite a broad population of 
circumstances. Here, humanitarian issues shall be circumscribed to specifically refer  
to humanitarian crises, categorized as a critical threat to the life, health, or security of a 
large group of people due to a natural, man-made, or complex emergency (Auvinen and 
Nafziger 1999).
The dependent variable in this project is the level of prioritization in the policy response 
of TAN and state decision-makers to humanitarian crises. Here, policy prioritization 
shall be operationalized in terms of the level of expenditure of material resources which 
decision-makers are willing to allocate to help alleviate a crisis, as well as the relative 
position of a crisis within their communicative agenda. The independent variables in the 
study are the prospective determinants of issue adoption by key decision-makers both 
at the state level and among TANs. Insights from the cognitive psychology literature 
pertaining to the use of heuristics in judgement formation, particularly heuristics related 
to availability, representative, and affect (emotion) biases, suggest a number of factors 
may affect why decision-makers may prioritize some humanitarian crises over others 
(McDermott 2001).
First, extrapolating from the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on the availability 
heuristic, as well as subsequent refinements in this area (e.g. Plous 1993; Gigerenzer 
1996), these factors may include state decision-makers’ cognitive accessibility of 
associations with a particular humanitarian crisis. Events which evoke images of 
graphic violence, for instance, whether directly relevant to the humanitarian issue under 
consideration or not, will more readily come to mind than events which include less 
explicit suffering and thus suggest an increased likelihood of an event taking place 
(Ross and Sicoli 1979; Taylor 1982; Mannis et al. 1993). In this way, when the availability 
heuristic is utilized in the interpretation of events, this will lead decision-makers to 
determine an increased probability of an event occurring, and will therefore attach an 
increased urgency to that event, when they perceive the event to possess particular 
characteristics such as instances of extreme violence. It is this resultant probability 
judgement, and the associated mental prioritization of events, which is of importance 
for this paper. A number of mechanisms may be at work in this regard. For example, 
extreme violence is likely to attract greater media attention than instances of human 
7suffering which the public are more accustomed to, such as hunger or disease. As a 
result, consumers of media are more likely to cognitively retrieve information related to 
events involving graphic violence and to prioritize these events in their policy judgements. 
However, frequency of media coverage of a topic is not merely sufficient for the 
availability heuristic to influence judgement. As Riddle (2010) finds, there is an interaction 
effect via the availability heuristic between the level of frequency of information which 
people are exposed to and the vividness of the information. In her experimental study of 
perceptions of crime, Riddle (2010) found that frequent exposure to vivid instances of 
violent crime caused participants to have an increased perception of the prevalence of 
crime, a finding which did not hold when participants were frequently exposed to images 
of crime which did not involve vivid instances of violence. Extending from this discussion, 
this paper advances the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be prioritized in international 
politics by TAN and state decision-makers when they are cognitively perceived to involve 
instances of extreme violence.
One aspect of utilizing the representative heuristic, on the other hand, pertains to the 
mental ranking of the relevance of information in judgement formation. Human beings 
have a tendency to pay particular attention to information which fits within a clear 
causal chain (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; McDermott 2001, pp. 9-14). The use of this 
heuristic “...results in judgements which privilege the outcomes of conjunctive scenarios 
with embedded causal arguments over outcomes which, although objectively just as 
likely, result from less easily imaginable sequences of events” (McDermott 2001, p. 10). 
This is because conjunctive scenarios may be viewed as more representative than a 
single constituent part of a given scenario, given that a specific chain of events may be 
cognitively retrieved more easily than broader less specific scenarios. Illustrating this 
point, in a study two groups of participants were questioned as to the likelihood of two 
scenarios in international relations occurring. One group was asked to rate the probability 
that in 1983 the United States would sever diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, while 
another group was asked to rate the probability that in 1983 the United States would 
sever diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet Union invading 
Poland. As a constituent part of the latter scenario the first option is inherently more 
8likely to occur, yet the majority of participants selected the second option to be more 
likely. In this manner, through the operation of the representative heuristic, people tend 
to exhibit an insensitivity to logical probabilities and may view more clear scenarios as 
more typical of a broader category of events (Gardiner 2010, p. 112). Decision-makers 
may therefore be more likely to select issues for attention which appear to display a clear 
causal story which can easily be envisioned, rather than alternative issues where the 
situation appears more complex or nebulous. On this basis, the following hypothesis is 
proposed:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be prioritized in international 
politics by TAN and state decision-makers when they are cognitively perceived to have a 
clear causal chain of blame to individuals or small groups of actors.
Finally, the affect heuristic also functions as a mental shortcut for weighing the pros and 
cons in decision-making processes. When using this heuristic people interpret levels of 
risk and the probability of certain outcomes through emotive intuitions. Decision-making 
is influenced by emotional feelings which have become associated with positive and 
negative images or narratives, such as those pertaining to culture or identity (Slovic et 
al. 2005). As Slovic et al. (2007, p. 1335) note, when interpreting events “...people consult 
or refer to an ‘‘affect pool’’ containing all the positive and negative tags consciously or 
unconsciously associated with...” the representations of events they have constructed 
in their minds, representations which have been formed in light of emotional reactions. 
Using instinctive emotional reactions may be an efficient cognitive short-cut in forming 
judgements and making decisions2. Extending from this, because we typically develop 
positive associations with those with whom we have associative relations or who exhibit 
similar behavioural practices to ourselves, we would expect that when victims involved in 
a humanitarian situation display similar cultural practices as a decision-maker the affect 
heuristic will cause a particularly acute emotional reaction which will influence their 
decisions. As a result of this, the following hypothesis is introduced:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be prioritized in international 
politics by TAN and state decision-makers when they cognitively perceive a shared cultural 
identity with the victims.
2 For empirical examples of the operation of the affect heuristic see: (Slovic et al. 2007, pp. 1336-1347).
9In addition, as the aforementioned heuristics are unlikely to be utilized by decision-
makers in isolation, interaction effects between the heuristics may be anticipated 
whereby the likelihood of crisis prioritization will increase if two or three of the heuristics 
operate contemporaneously. In recognition of this, the following relationships may 
also be hypothesized. It is expected that the effect of the cognitive perception of 
extreme violence on levels of prioritization will be amplified when decision-makers also 
perceive a clear causal chain of blame or a shared cultural identity with the victims of a 
humanitarian crisis (Hypothesis 4). It is further hypothesized that when decision-
makers perceive a clear causal chain of blame for a humanitarian crisis, this effect will be 
heightened when they also perceive the crisis to involve instances of extreme violence 
or a shared cultural identity with the victims (Hypothesis 5). It is also predicted that the 
effects of a perceived shared cultural identity with the victims will increase when the 
crisis is also perceived to involve instances of extreme violence or a clear causal chain 
of blame (Hypothesis 6). Finally, it is anticipated that when all of the three explanatory 
factors are present, it is more likely that a humanitarian issue will be prioritized than 
when any of the possible combination of pairs of independent variables are present 
(Hypothesis 7). This said, it is not anticipated that each of the respective interaction 
effects will be consistently additive in nature across all individuals. For instance, it may 
be the case that state decision-makers who do not share an affinity with the victims of 
a humanitarian crisis may actually be content to see those victims suffer instances of 
extreme violence in the presence of a clear causal chain of blame. In such a scenario, a 
negative score on the cultural affinity variable may increase the effect of the other two 
variables. For a summative overview of the study’s hypotheses see Table 1 below:
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Heuristic Associated with 
Independent Variables Hypotheses Regarding Main Effects
Availability Heuristic H1 — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be 
prioritized in international politics by TAN and state 
decision-makers when they are cognitively perceived 
to involve instances of extreme violence
Representative Heuristic H2 — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be 
prioritized in international politics by TAN and state 
decision-makers when they are cognitively perceived 
to have a clear causal chain of blame to individuals or 
small groups of actors
Affect Heuristic H3 — Humanitarian issues are more likely to be 
prioritized in international politics by TAN and state 
decision-makers when they cognitively perceive a 
shared cultural identity with the victims
Heuristic Interactions Hypotheses Regarding Interaction Effects
Availability-
Representative/
Availability-Affect
H4 — The effect of the cognitive perception of extreme 
violence on levels of prioritization will increase when 
decision-makers also perceive a clear causal chain of 
blame or a shared cultural identity with the victims
Representative-
Availability/ 
Representative-Affect
H5 — The effect of the cognitive perception of a clear 
causal chain on levels of prioritization will increase 
when decision-makers also perceive instances of 
extreme violence or a shared cultural identity with the 
victims
Affect-Availability/Affect-
Representative
H6 — The effect of the cognitive perception of a 
shared cultural identity with the victims on levels of 
prioritization will increase when decision-makers also 
perceive instances of extreme violence or a clear 
causal chain of blame
Availability-
Representative-Affect
H7 — When all three explanatory factors are present, 
levels of prioritization will be larger than when any 
of the individual pairs of independent variables are 
present
Table 1. Overview of Hypotheses to be Empirically Tested
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Section Three: Methodological Approach
The project’s central research question was addressed, and the above hypotheses 
tested, through the triangulation of empirical evidence ascertained using a mixed-
method approach. First, a multivariate factorial survey (vignette design) was utilized to 
test experimentally the prospective causal effects of the identified cognitive heuristics 
on political decision-making regarding humanitarian issues. Insights drawn from the 
experimental element of the study were then used to inform the qualitative aspect of the 
research design. Here, hypotheses which received support from the experimental data 
underwent further empirical evaluation through the use of seven semi-
structured interviews. These interviews were carried out with representatives of the Dutch 
and Irish Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Amnesty International, Lighthouse Relief, and the 
United Nations World Humanitarian Summit.
Existing psychological studies suggest that causal effects related to the availability, 
representative, and affect heuristics are particularly pertinent in judgement formation 
pertaining to situations of complexity and uncertainty, findings which appear especially 
relevant to international decision-making on humanitarian issues (see: McDermott 2001). 
However, we do not yet know which heuristic, if any, is dominant in judgement formation 
on humanitarian issues, if there is an interaction effect among heuristics, or if they work 
in the same manner for most individuals. The experimental component of this research 
design therefore served to deepen our understanding of the workings of cognitive 
heuristics as they relate to decision-making processes concerning humanitarian issues. 
In light of the experimental findings, semi-structured interviews with state and non-state 
decision-makers contributed to a more contextualized and real-world understanding of 
the proposed link between cognitive heuristics and humanitarian issue prioritization in 
the discourse and policy choices of TAN and state decision-makers.
Multivariate Factorial Survey 
The factorial survey involved the presentation of eight hypothetical scenarios relating to a 
humanitarian issue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) written in the style of  
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a newspaper story, each of equal length, to respondents using the online software package  
Qualtrics. In light of testing the seven hypotheses, selecting eight scenarios allowed for the 
systematic testing of all possible combinations of relationships among the independent 
variables as constructed in the vignettes, an approach which aided in the provision of 
a meaningful interpretation of the predicted effects under examination (Atzmüller and 
Steiner 2010). The eight scenarios included seven different treatment groups, as well as 
a control group with negative scores on each independent variable. Utilizing hypothetical 
scenarios aided in eliminating the influence of potentially biasing factors such as pre-
existing case knowledge among respondents. In their content the vignettes also controlled 
for a number of preeminent factors associated with decision-making on humanitarian 
scenarios of this nature, such as operational costs, victim death toll, feasibility of 
assistance, and likelihood of cooperative involvement with additional external actors3. 
The experiment employed a between-subjects design whereby each respondent was 
presented with a single scenario, thus ensuring independence of observations. 
Further, a between-subjects design helped to eliminate test-retest effects on participant 
judgements, whereby responses to earlier vignettes may have influenced responses to 
later vignettes, as well as a potential boredom effect (Field 2012, p. 88). Each scenario 
was presented using a Qualtrics algorithm which ensured a randomized and evenly-
distributed allocation of respondents to each of the scenarios, thus negating the need to 
assign participants to eight groups a priori. To overcome the problem of limited external 
validity, typically associated with experimental methods, vis-à-vis the entire population 
of decision-makers in the study, the subject pool included employees of the Stabilization 
and Humanitarian Aid Department of the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the human 
rights division of the Irish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Irish Ministries for Finance and 
Social Protection, as well as policy-makers on various committees at the United Nations, 
the European Union, and the Organization of American States. The subject pool also 
included employees of a number of Dutch, Irish, and international NGOs, as well as, for 
reasons of comparison, a convenience sample of Dutch, Irish, and international students 
and individuals employed outside of domestic or international policy fields.
As a preliminary step, four months prior to the study a pilot test of the factorial survey 
was conducted using a convenience sample of Leiden University students. This pilot 
3 For an overview of the vignette coding scheme, as well as each of the scenarios presented to the eight 
groups of respondents, see Table 1 in the Appendix A. The variables of interest have been underlined in  
each scenario.
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survey provided an opportunity to test the Qualtrics software, construct improved 
vignettes, refine the survey design, assess project feasibility, and plan the implementation 
of the main study. After the completion of the pilot study, student volunteers were then 
recruited for two rounds of cognitive interviewing regarding the survey content.  
The outcomes of the cognitive interviews were used to maximize uniformity of 
understanding of the survey items and vignettes across participants, to ensure 
measurement invariance, and to enhance the validity of findings.
Subsequently, in the main experiment itself, prior to testing the participants were  
asked to provide demographic information and permission to use their responses  
in the study. They were also questioned as to their general beliefs regarding how much  
of their budgets they believe national governments should allocate to humanitarian issues 
(measure of propensity to support humanitarian assistance), their knowledge of the 
conflict in the DRC (measure of case knowledge), their past or present involvement in 
humanitarian policymaking, as well as to their level of interest in foreign affairs (subjective 
proxy item for level of political knowledge). Gaining information on these latter questions 
helped to control for these important participant characteristics in the analysis, and to 
test their role as potential covariates. After reading their respective vignette, participants 
were then asked to register their judgement as to the level of prioritization they believe 
the humanitarian issue warrants in respect of the policy of their national government. 
To enhance the realism of, and acknowledge the inherent trade-offs in, decision-making 
processes of this kind, participants were asked to consider in their decision the finite 
resources available to governments as well as the multitude of global humanitarian  
issues which may also require attention. Concurrent with criteria for measurement of  
the outcome variable in ANOVA, these responses were measured on a 7-point  
Likert-type scale.
After the experimental data was collected, the main and interaction effects proposed 
in the study’s hypotheses were tested through planned contrasts and post-hoc tests 
using ANOVA models in the R software package. This statistical technique allowed 
for a comparison of “the amount of systematic variance in the data to the amount of 
unsystematic variance”, as it pertains to the respective grand means of each group  
(Field 2012, pp. 401-402). Further, an ANCOVA model was created using SPSS to 
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incorporate the effects of a number of potential covariates in the analysis which were  
not part of the primary experimental manipulation. An ANCOVA model was chosen  
given the capacity of this technique to enhance the probability that the study’s statistical 
analysis accurately assesses the null hypothesis of no inter-group mean differences, 
through a reduction of within-group error variance and the elimination of confounding 
factors through their evaluation as covariates (see: Keselman et al. 1998).
Operationalization of Variables
Before explicating the manner in which the independent variables were operationalized 
in the factorial survey, a brief overview of the content of the vignette scenarios is 
necessary. In the control group, whereby none of the independent variables are present, 
respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario related to the on-going conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Respondents were informed that over 200 people 
had been killed, including 67 peacekeepers, in an incident in the country’s North-Eastern 
province of Nord-Kivu. The victims were said to be killed during an armed confrontation, 
and no information was provided regarding who was responsible for the killings. In the 
seven treatment groups, different manipulations of the independent variables were 
included in the vignettes which they were presented.
The first independent variable, that is, perceptions of instances of extreme violence, was 
operationalized in the experiment by changing the scenarios with a positive score on 
this variable so that the victims were killed after being brutally tortured and executed. As 
noted in the paper’s theoretical discussion, the availability heuristic suggests that people’s 
cognitive accessibility of associations with a particular humanitarian crisis may influence 
their judgement and, by extension, that crises which exhibit more extreme violence are 
more likely to be prioritized than events which include less explicit suffering. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to vary the scenarios for this variable in terms of contrasting forms of 
violence. For example, if the control group was presented with a scenario where the 
victims had died from an alternative cause, such as disease or a natural disaster, while the 
independent variable was operationalized in terms of graphic violence, it would be unclear 
if the prospective variation between groups was due to violence in general or due to the 
extreme character of the violence. In light of this, the independent variable associated with 
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the availability heuristic was manipulated so that both positive and negative scores referred 
to acts of violence, with positive scores on this variable referring to more graphic violence.
The second independent variable to be tested, that is whether or not there is a 
perception of a clear causal chain of blame, was operationalized by assigning blame 
for the killings both to a specific government-aligned military group, as well as to its 
leader. In the scenarios where this variable is not present, respondents were informed 
that a number of military groups are known to operate in the Nord-Kivu region 
and that the perpetrators of the killings remain unknown. In this way, the scenarios 
communicate whether blame for the killings can be clearly apportioned or not. This form 
of operationalization is precisely concurrent with the two possible dimensions of the 
independent variable in Hypothesis 2, given its allusion to assigning blame to individuals 
or small groups of actors. Additionally, in the pilot study no significant effect was found in 
respect of this variable when it was operationalized by alluding solely to a specific military 
group. This raised the possibility that decision-makers’ perceptions of humanitarian crises 
may contrast when perpetrators are distinct non-state actors or are affiliated to national 
governments. In recognition of this, in the study the chosen operationalization specified 
that the military group in question was aligned to the Congolese government.
The independent variable related to the affect heuristic, whether or not decision-makers 
perceive a shared cultural identity with the victims, was operationalized by assigning the 
peacekeepers which were killed a shared nationality with the participant. When beginning 
the survey, respondents were asked to provide basic demographic information which 
included their nationality. Using a Qualtrics algorithm the nationality which they selected 
was subsequently inserted into the scenario they saw, if they were presented with a 
scenario with a positive score on that particular variable. In the control scenario, the 
respondent was not given any information regarding the nationality of the peacekeepers. 
Moreover, in relation to the possible effects of this variable, as the victims in this instance 
are peacekeepers rather than civilians, it may be the case that respondents view their 
deaths as somewhat less troublesome, as they may interpret it as a risk that is part of the 
job of an army member. Therefore, given the chosen means of operationalization, if an 
effect is found in this study one might also reasonably suggest that this effect would, at 
the very least, also be present if the victims were civilians.
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Participants
The sample size for the factorial survey was N=208. This represented a 93.7% completion 
rate from 222 respondents, with 26 usable survey responses per experimental group. 
Given that this number is well above the minimum group size for a meaningful analysis 
of inter-group variance using ANOVA models, we can be confident that the findings 
reported in this study are statistically robust and have not resulted from random effects 
(Field 2012, p. 412). A total of 67% of participants were involved in policy formation and 
decision-making at the national and international level, while 38% had worked directly on 
international humanitarian policy (for a detailed breakdown of the field of employment 
of the participants see: Table 2). Of these 51% were female and 49% were male, with a 
mean age of 31. The vast majority were educated to Bachelor (43%) and Master (39%) 
level4 , and 44% and 29% were Irish and Dutch respectively.
Table 2. Survey Participants: Field of Employment
4  An additional 14% completed secondary education, while 4% of participants held doctoral degrees.
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Qualitative Interviewing
Having carried out the lab experiment, the project then sought to ascertain a more 
contextualized understanding of the proposed link between cognitive heuristics and 
humanitarian issue prioritization in the discourse and policy choices of TAN and state 
decision-makers through the use of semi-structured interviewing. This approach was 
conducive to a focused discussion with relevant actors which contributed to the testing 
of the study’s hypotheses, while also incorporating a level of flexibility which provided 
subjects with the opportunity to raise issues which were relevant to the project and which 
were not anticipated in advance by the researcher. Semi-structured interviews were 
also preferred to allow for enhanced detail in the discussion and probing of responses, 
an approach which improves the validity of the information gathered and helps to avoid 
fixed-set responses which limit the ability of the researcher to establish a comprehensive 
understanding of respondents’ understanding of their decision-making processes (Leech 
2002; Berry 2002). A standardized interview template was created which was modified 
for each individual interview as required5. In respect of state decision-makers, interviews 
were conducted in person and via skype with two senior policy advisors on humanitarian 
aid and human rights policy at the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs and two members 
of Irish Aid and the Human Rights Unit at the Irish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Interviews 
were also conducted with policymakers at humanitarian NGOs and international bodies, 
including representatives of Amnesty International, Lighthouse Relief, and a regional 
facilitator for Europe and North America for the UN World Humanitarian Summit6.
Section Four: Results and Interpretation
While ANOVA is generally a robust test in respect of assumptions surrounding skew, 
kurtosis, and non-normality of data distribution (see: Glass et al. 1972), prior to conducting 
the analysis an assumption check for homogeneity of variance was carried using 
a Levene’s test. This produced a non-significant result at the 95% confidence level 
(df1=38, df2=168; p=.054), indicating that the assumption is satisfied. As a preliminary 
analytical step, a one-way ANOVA involving the eight groups was conducted to test 
the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the control and treatment 
5 For a sample interview template, used during the interview with a senior policy advisor and emergency aid 
specialist at the Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid Department in the Dutch Ministry for foreign affairs,  
see Appendix B 
 
6 For a profile of the interview respondents, also see Appendix B.
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group means. As can be seen in Table 3, this produced a significant result, and the null 
hypothesis was therefore rejected.
Table 3. One-Way ANOVA Between Experiment Groups
Prior to conducting the paper’s main statistical analysis, the study sought to ascertain 
whether there were significant differences in the responses selected by participants due 
to their field of employment or status and non-status as decision-makers in the policy 
field. To this end two simple linear regression models were created using data generated 
through the field of employment survey item. In the first model the prospective difference 
in levels of prioritization of the vignette scenarios between state decision-makers and 
those working for NGOs was evaluated. This produced a non-significant result (p=.599) 
at the 95% confidence level, suggesting there are no clear differences in responses 
between those who worked for governments and those who worked for NGOs. This result 
is perhaps unsurprising, given the large degree of occupational cross-over between those 
who work for NGOs and governmental agencies. Due to the small number of participants 
per category, decision-makers from the European Union and international institutions 
were not individually tested. In the second linear regression model a binary independent 
variable, whether a participant was engaged in policy decision-making or not, was 
created by respectively combining participants who worked for national governments, 
Sum of Sq. df Mean Sq. F Statistic Sig.
Between 
Groups
463,583 8 57,948 34,690 ,000
Within 
Groups
352,467 211 1,670
Total 816,050 219
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NGOs, the EU, and international institutions on one hand, and combining participants who 
indicated that they worked in other fields or were students on the other. In this instance 
the simple linear regression also returned a result which was non-significant (p=.366), 
illustrating that contrasting participant responses cannot be explained according to this 
variable (for a summation of the results of both simple linear regression models see: 
Table 4). In conjunction, these results suggest that the study’s findings are not merely 
applicable to particular demographic or occupational profiles, but that the psychological 
mechanisms which underpin decision-making on humanitarian issues and which are the 
focus of this study appear to be generalizable to the general population.
Table 4. Simple Linear Regression Models
Model 1 Sum of Sq. df Mean Sq. F Statistic Sig.
Regression ,636 1 ,636 ,277 ,599
Residual 296,020 129 2,295
Total 296,656 130
Model 2 Sum of Sq. df Mean Sq. F Statistic Sig.
Regression 2,283 1 2,283 ,820 ,820
Residual 573,597 206 2,784
Total 575,880 207
a. Dependent Variable: Humanitarian Issue Prioritization
b. Predictors: (Constant) Government/NGO
a. Dependent Variable: Humanitarian Issue Prioritization
b. Predictors: (Constant) Decision-maker/other
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ANOVA Planned Contrasts and Post-Hoc Tests
The paper’s statistical analysis of data generated from the factorial survey proceeded in a 
number of steps. First, to test the main effects of the independent variables as contained 
in the first three hypotheses a number of planned contrasts were implemented. ANOVA 
models were used to assess prospective differences between the control group and 
the three treatment groups which were manipulated to include a single positive score 
on each of the independent variables. Subsequently, to ascertain potential interaction 
effects among the independent variables, planned contrasts of the three groups with 
positive scores on two of the independent variables were then conducted in respect  
of the each of the appropriate three groups with one positive score. Lastly, the treatment 
group manipulated to have a positive score on all three independent variables was 
compared to the treatment groups with positive scores on two variables. After  
completing the planned contrasts Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) 
post-hoc test was performed using SPSS, a single-step statistical comparison which 
simultaneously evaluates the relationship between all possible pairs of group means. 
Tukey’s HSD test was preferred to other ANOVA post-hoc tests, such as the LSD (Least 
Significant Difference) test, as it corrects for multiple comparisons, reduces the likelihood 
of Type I error, and possesses superior accuracy in terms of p-values (Williams and  
Abdi 2010, p. 3).
To test the paper’s first hypothesis (H1) the data garnered from Group 8, whereby 
participants were presented with a scenario with a positive score on the variable related 
to the availability heuristic and negative scores on the two other variables of interest, 
was compared to Group 5, which is the control group with negative scores on all of 
the independent variables. The results of the ANOVA show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the groups, F(1,50) = 23.86, p<.05, with Group 8 more 
likely to select a higher response to the humanitarian crisis they were presented with. 
This finding confirms the paper’s theoretical expectation that decision-makers are more 
likely to prioritize a humanitarian situation when it is perceived to involve instances of 
extreme violence. While the initial output from the ANOVA does not provide information 
on the effect size, this was calculated by applying the summary.lm() function in R to the 
ANOVA model and taking the square root of the model’s R2 (for ANOVA: the eta squared). 
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The effect size which was produced (.568) exceeded the .5 threshold for a large effect. 
Therefore, the empirical data finds strong support for H1.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) was tested by comparing Group 7, where respondents were presented 
with scenarios with a positive score on the independent variable related to the 
representative heuristic and negative scores on the other independent variables, with 
the control group. The ANOVA also produced a statistically significance result, F(1,48) 
= 30.02, p<.05. Calculating the effect size we see a value of .619, which constitutes a 
large effect size. The empirical evidence therefore provides considerable evidence to 
support H2, and that decision-makers’ perception of a clear causal chain of blame for a 
humanitarian crisis is an important determinant in the likelihood of its prioritization. 
Through a planned contrast of Group 6, whereby the treatment group received a 
positive score on the variable pertaining to the affect heuristic, and the control group, 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) was then tested. The statistical analysis produced a result of F(1,54) 
= 5.546, p<.05. This suggests that when decision-makers form judgements regarding 
humanitarian crises, they are more likely to prioritize a crisis if they perceive a shared 
cultural identity with the victims. However, the effect size of the examined causal 
relationship (0.304) is moderate. The paper therefore finds some evidence to support H3, 
while the effect appears to be less pronounced than with the previous two hypotheses. 
With regard to interaction effects among the variables, the paper’s fourth hypothesis 
(H4) was tested by comparing Group 8 to Groups 2 and 3. Group 2 received scenarios 
with a positive score on the independent variables related to the availability and 
representative heuristics, and Group 3 had positive scores regarding the availability and 
affect heuristics. Comparing Group 8 and Group 2, we get the following non-significant 
result: F(1,50), 0.849, p>.05. Similarly, comparing Group 8 and Group 3 returns a result 
of F(1,50), 0.037, p>.05. Again, there is no statistically significant difference between 
the groups, with the evidence suggesting that H4 can be rejected. To test Hypothesis 5 
(H5), an ANOVA was carried out to compare Group 7 to Group 2 and Group 4. As noted, 
Group 2 was treated with a scenario with positive scores in respect of the availability 
and representative heuristics, while Group 4 received vignettes with positive scores on 
variables pertaining to the representative and affect heuristics. In both instances,  
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a non-significant result was produced (F(1,48), 2.671, p>.05; F(1,50), 0.584, p>.05), 
thereby providing no evidence in support of H5. To test Hypothesis 6 (H6) a planned 
contrast was conducted involving Group 6 and Group 3 and Group 4. As previously noted, 
while Group 6 has a sole positive score on the variable relating to the affect heuristic, 
Group 3 and Group 4 have positive scores on this variable too while also having a positive 
score on the independent variables associated with the availability and representative 
heuristic respectively. An ANOVA among Group 6 and Group 3 produces a result of 
F(1,54), 7.308, p<.05, which demonstrates a statistically significant difference between 
these groups. The effect size which was calculated (.345) provides moderate support 
in favour of the hypothesis. Further, comparing Group 6 and Group 4 we see F(1,54), 
8.723, p<.05, again producing findings which are statistically significant. There is also a 
moderate but notable effect size (.372). We may therefore conclude that the empirical 
evidence provides support for H6 and that the effects on humanitarian decision-making 
of a perceived shared cultural identity with the victims will increase when the crisis is also 
perceived to involve instances of extreme violence and there is a clear causal chain of 
blame, and will be moderated when these latter conditions are absent. The final planned 
contrast was carried out between Group 1, whereby respondents were treated with 
positive scores on all independent variables, and those groups which included a positive 
score on two of the variables, namely, Groups 2, 3, and 4. An ANOVA among these 
groups show that there is no significant difference among the three combinations of 
pairs. Extending from this, the empirical evidence provides no support for H7.
Further to the analysis of variance among the groups, Tukey’s HSD test was performed to 
provide a simultaneous illustration of which groups in the experiment significantly differ. 
The output of Tukey’s HSD test is presented below in Table 57:
7 To view table showing Homogeneous Subset output, see Appendix C. Groups listed in order of  
ascending means.
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Table 5. Tukey’s HSD Test: Multiple Comparisons Table
95% Confidence Interval
(I) group (J) group Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1,00         ,00
       2,00
       3,00
       4,00
       5,00
       6,00
       7,00
       8,00
 5,20000*
-,28000
,23846
,12308
2,29091*
1,20000*
,32000
,16154
,40630 
,36556 
,36203 
,36203 
,37782 
,35564 
,36556 
,36203
,000 
,998 
,999 
1,000 
,000 
,024 
,994 
1,000
3,9265 
-1,4258 
-,8963 
-1,0116 
1,1067 
,0853 
-,8258 
-,9732
6,4735 
,8658 
1,3732 
1,2578 
3,4751 
2,3147 
1,4658 
1,2963
2,00         ,00
       1,00
       3,00
       4,00
       5,00
       6,00
       7,00
       8,00
5,48000* 
,28000 
,51846 
,40308 
2,57091* 
1,48000* 
,60000 
,44154
,40630 
,36556 
,36203 
,36203 
,37782 
,35564 
,36556 
,36203
,000 
,998 
,884 
,972 
,000
,001
,781
,951
4,2065 
-,8658 
-,6163 
-,7316 
1,3867
,3653
-,5458
-,6932
6,7535 
1,4258
1,6532 
1,5378
3,7551
2,5947
1,7458
1,5763
3,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       4,00
       5,00
       6,00
       7,00
       8,00
4,96154* 
-,23846 
-,51846 
-,11538 
2,05245* 
,96154 
,08154 
-,07692
,40313
,36203 
,36203 
,35846 
,37440 
,35201
,36203 
,35846
,000 
,999 
,884 
1,000 
,000
,143
1,000
1,000
3,6980 
-1,3732 
-1,6532 
-1,2389 
,8790
-,1417
-1,0532
-1,2005
6,2251 
,8963
,6163 
1,0081
3,2259
2,0648
1,2163
1,0466
4,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       3,00
       5,00
       6,00
       7,00
       8,00
5,07692*
-,12308 
-,40308 
,11538 
2,16783* 
1,07692 
,19692 
,03846
,40313
,36203 
,36203 
,35846 
,37440 
,35201
,36203 
,35846
,000 
1,000 
,972 
1,000 
,000
,062
1,000
1,000
3,8134 
-1,2578 
-1,5378 
-1,0081 
,9943
-,0264
-,9378
-1,0851
6,3404 
1,0116
,7316 
1,2389
3,3413
2,1802
1,3316
1,1620
5,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       3,00
       4,00
       6,00
       7,00
       8,00
2,90909*
-2,29091* 
-2,57091* 
-2,05245* 
-2,16783* 
-1,09091 
-1,09091 
-2,12937*
,41736
,37782 
,37782
,37440 
,37440
,36822
,37782 
,37440
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000
,080
,000
,000
1,6010 
-3,4751
-3,7551 
-3,2259
-3,3413
-2,2450
-3,1551
-3,3029
4,2172 
-1,1067
-1,3867 
-,8790
-,9943
,0632
-,7867
-,9559
6,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       3,00
       4,00
       5,00
       7,00
       8,00
4,00000*
-1,20000* 
-1,48000* 
-,96154 
-1,07692
1,09091 
-,88000
-1,03846
,39739
,35564 
,35564
,35201 
,35201
,36822
,35564 
,35201
,000 
,024 
,001
,143 
,062
,080
,251
,083
2,7545 
-2,3147
-2,5947 
-2,0648
-2,1802
-,0632
-1,9947
-2,1417
5,2455 
-,0853
-,3653 
,1417
,0264
2,2450
,2347
,0648
7,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       3,00
       4,00
       5,00
       6,00
       8,00
4,88000*
-,32000
-,60000 
-,08154
-,19692
1,97091* 
,88000
-,15846
,40630
,36556 
,36556
,36203 
,36203
,37782
,35564 
,36203
,000 
,994 
,781
1,000
1,000
,000
,251
1,000
3,6065 
-1,4658
-1,7458 
-1,2163
-1,3316
,7867
-,2347
-1,2932
6,1535 
,8258
,5458 
1,0532
,9378
3,1551
1,9947
,9763
8,00         ,00
       1,00
       2,00
       3,00
       4,00
       5,00
       6,00
       7,00
5,03846*
-,16154
-,44154
,07692
-,03846
2,12937*
1,03846
,15846
,40313
,36203 
,36203
,35846 
,35846
,37440
,35201
,36203
,000 
1,000 
,951
1,000
1,000
,000
,083
1,000
3,7749 
-1,2963
-1,5763 
-1,0466
-1,1620
,9559
-,0648
-,9763
6,3020 
,9732
,6932 
1,2005
1,0851
3,3029
2,1417
1,2932
Inter-Group Comparison- Tukey HSD Test
Dependent Variable: Humanitarian Issue Prioritization
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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In summation, this paper finds evidence in support of the first three hypotheses, with 
particularly strong support for H1 and H2 and the respective effects of the availability 
and representative heuristics. In terms of interaction effects, the data analysis also 
provides support for H6. How might we interpret the fact that an interaction effect 
appears to be of consequence for humanitarian decision-making in the case of H6, 
but that this finding does not extend to H4, H5, and H7, despite the evidence that there 
is a statistically significant difference between the treatment groups which received 
scenarios with the independent variables presented in isolation and the control group? A 
number of explanations may potentially account for this. For example, given the specific 
operationalization of a perception of shared cultural identity with the victims, namely in 
terms of a shared nationality with respondents, it may be the case that this provided a 
more powerful trigger to respondents which was more conducive to a clear aggregation 
of levels of prioritization than with the other combinations of variables. Further, it may 
have been the case that the use of a 7-point Likert-type scale in the factorial survey, 
with a score of 7 representing a preference for the use of all of a country’s resources 
on a given scenario, may have obfuscated levels of prospective inter-group variation. 
This is because, given the plethora of high-profile real-world humanitarian issues 
globally, the 7-point Likert-type scale may have created an artificial ceiling in responses 
with respondents reluctant to select the highest points on the scale. Indeed this 
issue emerged during the cognitive interviewing process, with a number of volunteers 
highlighting the bearing which crises like the on-going conflict and refugee crisis in Syria 
had on their decision-making processes. In this way, the potential levels of inter-group 
variation may therefore have been restricted.
Analysis of Co-Variance
As a final step in the statistical analysis of the factorial survey, an ANCOVA model was 
created using SPSS to incorporate the potential effects of a number of covariates which 
were not part of the primary experimental manipulation. This technique both allows for 
a test of the potential significance of a number of additional explanatory variables in 
humanitarian decision-making, as well as helping to establish the reliability of the results 
regarding the paper’s hypotheses when these variables have been controlled for.  
To carry out this analysis, each individual experimental group was combined in the 
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dataset to create a grouping variable. Subsequently, each covariate was checked against 
the independent variables to ensure mutual independence (see: Field 2012, p. 468).
Examining the results of the ANCOVA (see: Table 6), we can see that gender differences 
(p=.438) were not a significant determinant of the level of prioritization which 
respondents selected in response to the vignettes they were presented with. Similarly, 
the results show that the general propensity of respondents to support humanitarian  
aid (p=.229), their level of education (.088), whether or not a respondent works in the 
field of humanitarian policy (p=.347), or had better knowledge of the conflict in the 
Congo (p=.862), did not have a significant effect on the outcome variable. On the other 
hand, respondents’ political knowledge (p=.011) and their nationality (p=.021) do have  
a significant effect on the level of prioritization. In the former case, this may be explained 
by the increased familiarity of respondents with global humanitarian causes which also 
require external assistance, while the latter variable may suggest that distinct political 
cultures, or indeed existing policy norms in different states, may influence decision-
making outcomes. Furthermore, in incorporating the above covariates in the analysis,  
we can see that the grouping variable is of statistical significance (p=.000). Indeed, 
looking at the partial eta squared value (.392), this indicates that group differences 
account for 39.2% of variance, a very high portion. The empirical evidence therefore 
suggests that, when a number of important covariates are included and controlled 
for in the analysis, a very large degree of the variability in responses in respect of the 
dependent variable is explained by the study’s independent variables, further indicating 
the robustness of findings from the ANOVA.
26
Table 6. ANCOVA Model
To conclude the data analysis of the factorial survey, the empirical evidence provides 
support for four of the study’s hypotheses. It appears that whether decision-makers 
perceive a crisis to involve instances of extreme violence, a clear causal chain of blame, 
or a shared cultural identity with the victims, all have a significant and considerable 
impact on levels of humanitarian issue prioritization. In addition, the ANOVA of the 
experimental groups suggest that there is a positive interaction effect between a 
perception of a shared cultural identity with the victims and the other independent 
variables. In other words, if decision-makers perceive a humanitarian issue to involve this 
factor, they are more likely still to prioritize it if they also perceive the issue to involve 
extreme violence or a clear causal chain of blame. With regard to seeking a more 
contextualized understanding of humanitarian decision-making in international politics 
Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares
df Mean Sq. F Statistic Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
Corrected Model
Intercept
Gender
Level of Education
Hum. Policymaker
Pol. Knowledge
Case Knowledge
Hum. Aid Pref.
Nationality
Group
Error
Total
Corrected Total
245,819a
37,071
1,040
5,049
1,529
11,327
,052
2,507
9,360
212,566
330,061
4979,000
575,880
15
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
192
208
207
16,388
37,071
1,040
5,049
1,529
11,327
,052
2,507
9,360
26,571
1,719
9,533
21,565
,605
2,937 
,889
6,589
,030
1,459
5,445
15,456
,000
,000
,438
,088
,347
,011
,862
,229
,021
,000
,427
,101
,003
,015
,005
,033
,000
,008
,028
,392
a. R Squared = ,427 (Adjusted R Squared = ,382)
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through semi-structured interviewing, the implications of the factorial survey data suggest 
that the study’s three independent variables may be of causal significance and are 
subject to further testing, as well as the interaction effects contained in H6. The evidence 
from the experimental component of the study casts doubt on a number of the paper’s 
hypotheses which encompass interaction effects, which in turn may be ruled out from 
consideration in the analysis of data garnered from the interviews.
Semi-Structured Interviews
In addition to the experiment, data was gathered from seven interviews with individuals 
working in the field of humanitarian politics and relief. These included four senior 
policymakers in the human rights and humanitarian aid divisions of the Dutch and Irish 
Ministries for Foreign Affairs, two NGO representatives from Amnesty International and 
Lighthouse Relief, as well as a UN World Humanitarian Summit facilitator for the Europe 
and North America region. These interviews provided mixed support for the paper’s 
hypotheses, while also introducing a number of factors which respondents viewed as 
preeminent in their decision-making processes concerning humanitarian issues.
In respect of H1, the semi-structured interviews produced somewhat conflicting results, 
which in part appears to reflect a distinction between the priorities of state decision-
makers and non-governmental actors. During the interview with the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ (DMFA) emergency aid specialist, the respondent presented a 
document detailing the major beneficiaries of Dutch government aid. While stating that 
the allocation of the department’s resources were based on humanitarian principles, 
the needs of victims, and extensive consultation with partner organizations, the 
representative acknowledged that almost without exception every one of the major 
recipients of Dutch aid was a state or region which was currently affected by an armed 
conflict (Interview 1, DMFA). Dutch policy is not unique in this regard, reflecting a broad 
trend among governments over the last decade to focus more of their humanitarian 
resources on conflict zones8.
Similarly, during the interview conducted with a senior policy advisor on human rights at 
the DMFA, the respondent intimated that in principle they expected to see no difference 
8 In the past 10 years, humanitarian aid has undergone a large shift away from natural disaster relief to 
targeting areas of violent conflict. Currently about 80% of global aid goes to people affected by conflict 
(USIP 2016).
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in the allocation of resources from the Multilateral Organizations and Human Rights 
Department due to the particular type of crisis (Interview 2, DMFA). This response 
was echoed by a senior policy official from Irish Aid at the Irish Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (IDFA) who also suggested that, in principle, in their decision-making 
the humanitarian needs of people superseded the types of humanitarian crises which 
were taking place (Interview 4, IDFA). Both respondents pointed out, however, that in 
reality the striking nature of the images of suffering which emerge from armed conflict 
may lead to more policy attention. According to the Dutch respondent two mechanisms 
may be at play here; either decision-makers in the cabinet government will choose 
to prioritize a conflict based on their individual preferences, or they may respond to 
pressure from domestic actors to prioritize a specific humanitarian issue (Interview 2, 
DMFA). In this way, attempts to utilize objective metrics for resource allocation, such as 
through engagement with specialist partners in the NGO sector, may in a given situation 
be rendered subordinate to political exigencies. Indeed, as came across in all of the 
interviews, humanitarian decision-making within the state bureaucracy appeared to be 
considerably more sensitive to domestic factors such as public expectations and the 
preferences of government parties. Further, although it is difficult to infer a direct causal 
relationship between perceptions of extreme violence on the part of Dutch and Irish 
decision-makers and their policy outcomes, the evidence from the interviews, as well as 
the DMFA’s pattern of resource allocation, does indicate that state policymakers tend to 
overwhelmingly prioritize humanitarian issues associated with violent conflicts.
On the other hand, in the interview with the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) facilitator 
the respondent highlighted a difference in levels of decision-making in relation to political 
and humanitarian actors. As conflict resolution typically requires intervention at the 
level of state government, there may be a degree of engagement with conflict zones 
at the state level which is not reflected among non-state humanitarian organizations, 
which tend to be more focused on victim need irrespective of the form of crisis. In this 
sense, whether victims need help as a result of war, a natural disaster, or another form 
of crisis is immaterial (Interview 7, WHS). Moreover, the demographic make-up of the 
organization in question was also raised by the respondent as an important variable in 
issue prioritization. For instance, from the interviewee’s experience, young people are 
particularly motivated to support educational programmes in crisis situations to avoid 
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“lost generations”, such as arranging teaching facilities in refugee camps. This said, it was 
made clear in the interview that many humanitarian issues such as this, which are more 
long-term in orientation, may be superseded by the need for an emergency response, 
with the respondent noting that “you cannot give a book to someone who is hungry”, 
and that the first priority “must always be to ensure that victims are safe” (Interview 7, 
WHS). Safety from violence and other immediate threats to human welfare was therefore 
regarded as a prerequisite condition which underpinned subsequent humanitarian policy 
preferences. This line of reasoning was consistent with findings from the interview with 
a programme officer for Lighthouse Relief. Here, the respondent posited that the NGO’s 
primary concern was the physical and mental well-being of victims. However, whether 
the well-being of victims was threatened due to a situation of violence or otherwise was 
regarded as incidental, and the respondent made clear that, in the carrying out of their 
work, Lighthouse Relief did not differentiate between victims based on whether or not 
they were fleeing areas affected by violent conflict (Interview 6, Lighthouse Relief). In 
sum, the semi-structured interviews provided mixed support for H1, with state decision-
makers apparently more likely than those working for NGOs to prioritize humanitarian 
issues when they involved instances of violence.
With regard to H2, the empirical evidence derived from the interviews provided 
considerable support for this hypothesis. For example, during the interview with the 
representative for Amnesty International, the respondent contended that the organization 
typically attempted to conceptualize all humanitarian crises in terms of a chain of blame 
or responsibility. This is because the ultimate goal of Amnesty is to pressure particular 
actors so as to bring about desirable policy changes to support victims of humanitarian 
problems. As the respondent noted, even in the case of humanitarian crises where 
no particular actor can be blamed, “many humanitarian disasters are followed by 
human-made disasters...”, including the breakdown of societal infrastructure, increased 
vulnerability of women and children, and inequitable distribution of resources (Interview 
5, Amnesty International). For Amnesty, analysing humanitarian issues in terms of victims 
and causal chains of blame and responsibility is viewed as a key aspect of their work, as 
this allows the organization to actively lobby and pursue policy changes. Furthermore, the 
interview with Lighthouse Relief was suggestive of increased support for this hypothesis. 
Here, the responded observed that much of the NGOs financial support came from 
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donors who were very well informed about the situations facing refugees in Europe, 
particularly those fleeing Syria. When asked by the researcher if they believed that the 
level of financial support the NGO received was affected in any way by the prominence 
in the public mind of actors operating in Syria such as Bashar al-Assad’s government 
forces and the Islamic State (IS), they stated that “...they [the donors] were very receptive 
to the fact that these people were fleeing war, I think this fact made a big difference” 
(Interview 6, Lighthouse Relief). It was clear, according to the interviewee, that donors 
were very much aware of the actors involved in the conflict and that they were more 
likely to contribute financing to the NGO because they knew the type of actors that 
Syrian refugees were fleeing from. Thus, as mentioned above, while Lighthouse Relief 
themselves made an effort not to differentiate between victims which were fleeing from 
conflict zones which had experienced high levels of violent conflict, it appears that a 
substantial portion of the financing which the NGO attracted was influenced by the 
donor’s knowledge that Lighthouse Relief would be using these resources to help people 
who were fleeing war, and specific actors such as Assad’s forces and IS.
This evidence is concurrent with the experience of the DMFA’s human rights advisor. 
While those working in the department ordinarily made strident efforts to ensure an 
even-handed approach to the distribution of resources to global humanitarian crises, 
the respondent was cognisant of political limitations to these efforts. The expectations 
placed on Dutch government politicians to act on a humanitarian crisis which arise from a 
dynamic of increased media focus, public opinion, and other governments internationally 
who are themselves taking action, may at least in part emanate from the presentation 
of a humanitarian crisis in clear causal terms relating to a specific actors. As a result, 
policy-makers in the state bureaucracy may have to adjust their policy priorities in line 
with government instructions, even if this conflicts which existing policy frameworks 
(Interview 2, DMFA). However, contravening this evidence, the respondent from the 
IDFA Human Rights Unit suggested that a clear causal chain of blame would not have 
any bearing on decision-making outcomes, and that the focus was more on helping 
victims than on pinpointing a perpetrator, which in many circumstances may prove 
difficult (Interview 3, IDFA). Indeed the DMFA’s emergency aid specialist asserted the 
opposite relationship between causal chains of blame and issue prioritization, stating 
that “it’s easier to get support from the public for [crises like] natural disasters because 
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there is no-one to blame, and we have seen that in public events to raise money [for 
humanitarian causes]” (Interview 1, DMFA). Illustrating this, the respondent cited the 
experience of the Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO), a collective of Dutch NGOs 
which collaborate on specific fundraising projects for major humanitarian crises to 
maximize the effectiveness of their campaigns. When the SHO attempted to raise money  
for victims of the Syrian conflict, the intake of donations was much less than when the 
SHO mobilized to raise funds for recent natural disasters in the Philippines and Nepal. 
The respondent speculated that this may have been because the cases of the Philippines 
and Nepal exclusively involved innocent victims, while the Syrian crisis had perhaps 
become politically complicated by apportioning blame to specific actors (Interview 1, 
DMFA). However, another prospective explanation of this outcome is the over-saturation 
of appeals for the Syrian crisis, and given the emerging nature of the crises in the 
Philippines and Nepal donors may have been more willing to support a new humanitarian 
cause. In summation, the interviewing process offered considerable evidence for H2, with 
clear causal chains of blame for humanitarian problems appearing to be of significant 
influence in issue prioritization, both as a useful tool for issue conceptualization and for 
attracting the attention of decision-makers.
Strong empirical evidence was also provided in favour of H3, with the identity of victims 
being particularly salient for state decision-makers. In their interview, the human rights 
advisor at the DMFA strongly emphasized the importance of whether Dutch nationals 
were directly involved in a humanitarian issue, whether as perpetrators or victims. For 
example, if a company which is domiciled in the Netherlands has been suspected or 
implicated in human rights abuses, or Dutch nationals are the victims of human rights 
abuses, the Dutch government is almost certain to act. This interview was also indicative 
of the plausibility of H6, which hypothesized that there may be an interaction effect 
between perceptions of a shared cultural identity with victims of human rights abuses 
and perceptions of the presence of extreme violence. On this potential interaction, 
the interviewee was confident that if Dutch nationals had suffered violence, or would 
potentially be subject to a violent breach of their human rights, the Dutch government 
would be compelled to act. However, whether there was a clear chain of blame or not in 
such circumstances was viewed as superfluous, as the government was likely to act to 
safeguard their citizens irrespective of this factor (Interview 2, DMFA). The respondent 
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from the Human Rights Unit of the IDFA also revealed the importance of the identity  
of victims in their policy priorities, noting the special responsibility they fulfilled in 
protecting Irish citizens aboard. One recent and prominent case they noted was that  
of Ibrahim Halawa, currently incarcerated in Egypt for taking part in political protests.  
The Irish department of foreign affairs have made clear the importance they placed on 
the safety of Halawa as an Irish citizen, with representatives from the Irish Embassy in 
Egypt visiting him on over 50 occasions. Moreover, offering further evidence for this 
hypothesis, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly stated that this level of attention 
would be afforded to any Irish citizen whose human rights may be being breached 
(Interview 3, IDFA).
Conversely, both respondents from the WHS and Lighthouse Relief emphasized that the 
identity of victims do not matter. Rather, more important in their respective decision-
making processes was the rights that individuals were afforded under international 
law (Interview 6, Lighthouse Relief; Interview 7, WHS). This said, the representative 
from Amnesty International provided extremely useful insight into the application of 
humanitarian principles in practice when it comes to victim identity. Concurrent with 
humanitarian principles, Amnesty have routinely campaigned on behalf of egregious 
individuals when they believe their rights have been ignored. As an example, the 
respondent cited Amnesty’s legal campaigns on behalf of terror suspects and to stop 
the execution of Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Iraq War, stating that “there are 
campaigns which we work on just because we think the issue is important, regardless 
of their popularity” (Interview 5, Amnesty International). Despite this, it was noted that 
while Amnesty will still campaign on these kinds of issues, they are not completely 
insensitive to opportunism and selective strategies in their campaign operations. 
Illustrating this point, with the case of the execution of Saddam Hussein, in reality this 
campaign expended a relatively small amount of resources and comparatively little 
energy was devoted to mobilizing public and international opinion. In such circumstances, 
it appears than the level of resonance which the cause of the victim has with public and 
international opinion is a factor which is considered in humanitarian decision-making. 
While Amnesty will apply humanitarian principles consistently, and will not neglect their 
responsibility to tackle humanitarian issues, irrespective of who the victim is, the relative 
level of attention and resources they allocate to a given issue may be affected by the 
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identity of the victim. Thus, in relation to both H3 and H6, this paper finds evidence to 
support both of these hypotheses.
During the course of the interviewing process, respondents also introduced a number 
of factors which they adjudged to be of central importance in their decision-making 
processes and which require acknowledgement. One recurring factor which respondents 
raised was the presence of an operational vacuum relating to an issue which needed to 
be filled. The express purpose of the formation of Lighthouse Relief, for instance, and 
the primary factor which informed their work, was the perception of a failure on the 
part of existing organizations to adequately deal with the large influx of refugees into 
Europe. Moreover, working through a smaller organization allowed the NGO to adapt to 
unanticipated events in the unfolding refugee crisis more quickly than the larger, more 
established organizations (Interview 6, Lighthouse Relief). The Amnesty International 
representative also highlighted the issue of organizational gaps. One example which 
they cited was that Amnesty’s organization in the Netherlands had put in place a large 
refugee department to aid refugees in the asylum process. However, this was subsequently 
dismantled as it was recognized that there were many other bodies within the Netherlands 
who carried out this work. Amnesty therefore decided to shift its focus, and the 
prioritization of its resources, toward issues which they felt had been neglected heretofore 
(Interview 5, Amnesty International).
Another key factor which the respondents raised was the availability of requisite levels of 
information on a humanitarian issue. For example, an important part of the decision-making 
process on humanitarian issues for the DMFA is their engagement with partner NGOs. 
These partners will often possess areas of expertise which the ministry lacks and, because 
their staff may be more active on the ground in affected areas, they are vital sources 
of knowledge for the DMFA. As the DMFA’s emergency aid specialist put it (Interview 1, 
DMFA), without robust and reliable information the Dutch government is simply not in a 
position to take action on a given issue, and this may have a large impact on which causes 
end up being prioritized. This sentiment was echoed by the respondent from Amnesty, 
asserting that “for Amnesty in the Netherlands, sometimes the choice between one issue 
or another comes down to whether we have good research. If we have good reports and 
research, then we can campaign” (Interview 5, Amnesty International). Further, the Irish Aid 
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division of the IDFA relies heavily on adequate research to inform their policy priorities, 
allocating €30 million annually for research purposes and to help ensure evidence-based 
decision-making. Indeed, Irish Aid have implemented a 5-year research strategy to build 
their research capacity and to improve their knowledge of several policy areas within 
their remit (Interview 4, IDFA). Informational resources were therefore viewed as a crucial 
factor, for both state and NGO decision-makers, in the likelihood of a humanitarian issue 
being prioritized.
To conclude, interpreting the data which was garnered from the interviews appears to 
provide mixed support for the study’s hypotheses. With regard to H1, it does appear that 
state policymakers tend to overwhelmingly prioritize humanitarian issues associated 
with violent conflicts, indicating the plausibility of this hypothesis. This finding does not 
appear to apply as strongly in the case of NGOs, with respondent’s consistently asserting 
that the form of suffering which victims experience did not affect the likelihood of one 
issue being prioritized over another. In relation to H2, the interviews offered considerable 
empirical evidence for this hypothesis. The perception of a clear causal chain of blame 
for humanitarian problems appears to have a significant influence in issue prioritization, 
both as a tool for issue conceptualization and for attracting the attention of state and NGO 
decision-makers. Strong evidence was also found for H3, the hypothesis which pertains 
to a perception of shared cultural values with victims. The evidence suggests that national 
governments are almost certain to take action on a humanitarian issue if the victims include 
citizens of that country. Although respondents from non-governmental organizations 
were more inclined to emphasize the objective application of humanitarian principles, 
in the practical operation of campaigns the evidence also suggested that the perceived 
cultural identity and values of victims was of causal significance for this paper’s outcome 
variable. Moreover, the interviewing process also revealed further support for H6, with the 
evidence suggesting that state decision-makers are essentially compelled to act when their 
citizens may be the victims of violence. This positive finding, however, did not extend to an 
interaction effect between perception of a shared cultural identity and a clear causal chain 
of blame, with the effect of the latter variable appearing negligible. Finally, the interviewing 
process also highlighted the important role other factors, such as the degree of attention 
an issue has received from other actors, as well as the availability of requisite informational 
resources, which are key determinants of whether an issue is prioritized or not.
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Section Five: Conclusion
In light of an ostensible inability of existing explanatory frameworks to account for 
variation in patterns of humanitarian issue adoption, this study advanced a political 
psychology approach to the question of when and why some humanitarian issues 
are prioritized over others in international politics. The paper empirically tested the 
proposition that the cognitive perception of humanitarian issues by key actors is a central 
determinant in the adoption and non-adoption of issues by TANs and state decision-
makers. The study’s hypotheses were tested through utilizing a mixed-methods approach 
encompassing experimental and qualitative elements. A multivariate factorial survey 
was carried out on a subject pool which included state and NGO decision-makers, 
enhancing the external validity of findings and therein overcoming a common drawback 
of experimental designs. To seek a more contextualized understanding of the proposed 
link between cognitive heuristics and humanitarian issue prioritization semi-structured 
interviews were also conducted with a number of TAN and state decision-makers.
The evidence emerging from the factorial survey offered empirical support for four of 
the study’s hypotheses. The results of the experiment suggested that whether decision-
makers perceive a crisis to involve instances of extreme violence, a clear causal chain of 
blame, or a shared cultural identity with the victims, all have a significant impact on levels 
of humanitarian issue prioritization. The relationship was particularly strong in respect of 
H1 and H2, with a large effect size being produced. Empirical evidence was also found 
to support H3, albeit the effect was moderate and less pronounced than with the former 
two hypotheses. The vignette study also provided evidence in support of H6, indicating 
a positive interaction effect between the perception of a shared cultural identity with 
victims and the paper’s two other independent variables. These results ruled out H4,  
H5, and H7 for the purposes of triangulation of evidence using the semi-structured 
interviews, albeit as discussed above this may in part be explained as an artefact of  
the measurement instrument for the outcome variable in the experimental design.
Subsequent qualitative investigation of these findings through semi-structured interviews 
of state and NGO decision-makers revealed mixed support for the four hypotheses. 
While H2 and H3 received clear support among those interviews, evidence in favour of 
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H1 appeared to have been contingent on whether the respondent worked for the state 
or an NGO. The interviews revealed that state decision-makers allocate the vast majority 
of their humanitarian resources to victims of conflict situations, while NGOs tend to 
spread their resources in a more even-handed manner. Discordant results were also 
found in respect of H6, with an interaction effect between the perception of a shared 
cultural identity with victims and the occurrence of extreme violence displaying a positive 
relationship, while no interaction effect between the former variable and perceptions of  
a clear causal chain of blame was evident.
The results of this study are significant for a number of reasons. First, the paper uses an 
innovative methodology to contribute to an on-going debate in the IR literature regarding 
why certain humanitarian issues are prioritized over others in international politics. The 
study will also be of use for scholars seeking to understand the role of psychological 
processes in political, organizational, and network-based decision-making, as well as 
for those engaged in debates surrounding the emergence of international norms and 
the prospective role of media effects in political judgement formation in respect of 
humanitarian issues. From a societal perspective, the paper’s findings will help to inform 
efforts by decision-makers in the field of humanitarianism to utilize their resources as 
effectively as possible. In terms of future research, given the importance of imagery 
in cognitive perception and retrieval of information, it may be fruitful to design an 
experiment which encompasses both textual and visual elements. Further, in addition 
to testing the effects of cognitive heuristics, political psychology studies of this nature 
would benefit from exploring the implications of recent advancements in the field of 
social, organizational, and cognitive psychology, such as findings relating to the impact of 
emotions such as anger or disgust on information processing and decision-making (see: 
Zeelenberg et al. 2008). 
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Appendix A
Vignette coding scheme and scenarios
Vignette 1
Over 200 brutally executed, including 67 {nationality} peacekeepers, as government-
aligned PALC escalate Congolese conflict
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper shows the victims, which included 67 {nationality} peacekeepers working in 
Groups
Variable 1  
(Availability Heuristic)
Variable 2
(Representative 
Heuristic)
Variable 3
(Affect Heuristic)
Group 1 1 1 1
Group 2 1 1 2
Group 3 1 2 1
Group 4 2 1 1
Group 5 2 2 2
Group 6 2 2 1
Group 7 2 1 2
Group 8 1 2 2
NB: Positive and negatives scores on the independent variables are indicated by values 1 and 2 respectively. 
Scenario 5 is the control group, with negative scores on the three independent variables.
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the region, to have been brutally tortured and executed by their captors. Responsibility 
for the killings has been claimed by Peniel Karome, leader of the Congolese People’s 
Liberation Front (PALC), an armed group which are known to operate in the region and 
locals say are aligned to the Congolese government. The killings have been condemned 
by senior UN officials, and world leaders are expected to discuss the formation and 
financing of a new coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the region at a forthcoming 
summit in Paris on June 2nd.
Vignette 2
Over 200 brutally executed, including 67 {nationality} peacekeepers, as Congolese  
conflict escalates 
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper shows the victims, which included 67 {nationality} peacekeepers working in 
the region, to have been brutally tortured and executed by their captors. Responsibility 
for the killings remains unknown, with a number of armed groups known to operate in the 
region. The killings have been condemned by senior UN officials, and world leaders are 
expected to discuss the formation and financing of a new coalition peacekeeping force to 
stabilize the region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on June 2nd.
Vignette 3
Over 200 brutally executed, including 67 peacekeepers, as government-aligned PALC 
escalate Congolese conflict
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper shows the victims, which included 67 peacekeepers working in the region, to 
have been brutally tortured and executed by their captors. Responsibility for the killings 
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has been claimed by Peniel Karome, leader of the Congolese People’s Liberation Front 
(PALC), an armed group which are known to operate in the region and locals say are 
aligned to the Congolese government. The killings have been condemned by senior UN 
officials, and world leaders are expected to discuss the formation and financing of a new 
coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on  
June 2nd.
Vignette 4
Over 200 killed, including 67 {nationality} peacekeepers, as government-aligned PALC 
escalate Congolese conflict
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper suggests the victims, which included 67 {nationality} peacekeepers working 
in the region, were killed during an armed confrontation. Responsibility for the killings 
has been claimed by Peniel Karome, leader of the Congolese People’s Liberation Front 
(PALC), an armed group which are known to operate in the region and locals say are 
aligned to the Congolese government. The killings have been condemned by senior UN 
officials, and world leaders are expected to discuss the formation and financing of a new 
coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on  
June 2nd.
Vignette 5
Over 200 killed, including 67 peacekeepers, as Congolese conflict escalates
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper suggests the victims, which included 67 peacekeepers working in the 
region, were killed during an armed confrontation. Responsibility for the killings remains 
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unknown, with a number of armed groups known to operate in the region. The killings 
have been condemned by senior UN officials, and world leaders are expected to discuss 
the formation and financing of a new coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the region 
at a forthcoming summit in Paris on June 2nd.
Vignette 6
Over 200 killed, including 67 peacekeepers, as government-aligned PALC escalate 
Congolese conflict
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper suggests the victims, which included 67 peacekeepers working in the region, 
were killed during an armed confrontation. Responsibility for the killings has been 
claimed by Peniel Karome, leader of the Congolese People’s Liberation Front (PALC), an 
armed group which are known to operate in the region and locals say are aligned to the 
Congolese government. The killings have been condemned by senior UN officials, and 
world leaders are expected to discuss the formation and financing of a new coalition 
peacekeeping force to stabilize the region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on June 2nd.
Vignette 7
Over 200 killed, including 67 {nationality} peacekeepers, as Congolese  
conflict escalates
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper suggests the victims, which included 67 {nationality} peacekeepers working 
in the region, were killed during an armed confrontation. Responsibility for the killings 
remains unknown, with a number of armed groups known to operate in the region. The 
killings have been condemned by senior UN officials, and world leaders are expected to 
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discuss the formation and financing of a new coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the 
region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on June 2nd.
Vignette 8
Over 200 brutally executed, including 67 peacekeepers, as Congolese conflict escalates
More than 200 people were killed on Monday, April 18th in the North-Eastern province 
of Nord-Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Film footage acquired by this 
newspaper shows the victims, which included 67 peacekeepers working in the region, to 
have been brutally tortured and executed by their captors. Responsibility for the killings 
remains unknown, with a number of armed groups known to operate in the region. The 
killings have been condemned by senior UN officials, and world leaders are expected to 
discuss the formation and financing of a new coalition peacekeeping force to stabilize the 
region at a forthcoming summit in Paris on June 2nd.
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Appendix B
Sample Interview Template9
Position: Senior Policy Advisor and Emergency Aid Specialist 
Department: Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department, Dutch Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 
Interview Location: Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bezuidenhoutseweg 67, The 
Hague, Netherlands 
Time and date: 16:00h, 17/05/2016
1)  Could you tell me a little bit about yourself, such as the department you work in,  
     your job title, how long you have worked here, and your role and responsibilities  
     at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs?
2)  The Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (DSH) provides  
     humanitarian support and reconstruction before, during and after crisis  
     situations. However, the issues which arise in attempting to promote peace and  
     security, rule of law and good governance are exceptionally diverse, from ending  
     torture and war crimes to supporting freedom of speech and women’s rights.  
     Each of these human rights issues possess their own unique policy and  
     operational challenges. Moreover, given the unique character of each issue, it  
     may be difficult to calculate which issues are most in need of attention.
     (i)  In light of this, how does your department try to adjudicate between these
     different types of human rights issues in the allocation and prioritization of 
     its resources?
     (ii)  In general, are there types of human rights abuses or issues which, when  
     they arise, you view as particularly pressing to work on?
9 Note: This template formed a foundational basis for the interview. Due to the nature of semi-structured 
interviewing, a number of follow-up questions were asked to focus the discussion, clarify responses, and to 
afford the respondent the opportunity to raise issues they felt were important and were not anticipated in 
advance by the researcher.
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3)  (i) Could you tell me about the humanitarian issues which your department has  
     worked on and prioritized so far in 2016?
     (ii)  Also, could you outline the process behind how these humanitarian issues `
     were chosen over other potential issues?
4)  As I have mentioned, your department works to alleviate humanitarian problems  
     before, during, and after crises.
     (i) In the organization of your work, how do you balance unfolding humanitarian  
     situations which require rapid responses, for example issues arising from the 
     conflict in Syria, with your more long-term projects pertaining to say, building 
     states’ capacities?
     (ii) Under certain conditions, and given your limited resources, may one of these 
     types of issues take precedence over the other?
5)  With some humanitarian issues, such as those pertaining to conflict and related  
     crimes, there may be a clear perpetrator of the abuses. With other issues the  
     blame may be less clear, as with human rights issues which arise from  
     natural disasters. 
 
     (i) How do your response strategies differ in both of these kinds of cases, when  
     there is a clear actor to blame for a breaching of human rights and when there  
     appears to be no-one to blame?
     (ii) From your experience, are proposals to spend your department’s resources  
     more likely to be met with political approval when they concern cases where  
     specific actors have perpetrated abuses, or when the focus is on cases where  
     no-one is immediately to blame for victims’ suffering?
6)  In many instances, the line between perpetrator and victim of human rights  
     abuses may be unclear. Some groups who are now victims may also have  
     perpetrated abuses in the past, or may continue to do so e.g. in a civil 
     war situation.
     (i) How does your department approach this problem when selecting issues  
     to prioritize?
     (ii) Do you tend to prioritize the rights of individuals or groups which have not  
     been complicit in abuses and are clearly just victims, or do the identities and  
     actions of the victims not matter, even if they are committing abuses themselves?
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Respondent Profiles10
Interview 1: Senior Policy Advisor and Emergency Aid Specialist, Department  
of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid, Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Interview 2: Senior Policy Advisor, Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights 
Department, Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Interview 3: Senior Policy Official, Human Rights Unit, Irish Department of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade.
Interview 4: Senior Policy Official, Emergency and Recovery Division, Irish Aid,  
Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Interview 5: Senior Actions and Events Organizer (with special responsibility for unfolding 
humanitarian issues and unplanned campaigns), Amnesty International, Netherlands.
Interview 6: Programme Officer, Lighthouse Relief, Greece.
Interview 7: Facilitator, Europe/North America Region, United Nations World Humanitarian 
Summit.
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Appendix C
Homogeneous Subset output
Group N
Subset for alpha = 0.05
1 2 3 4
,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
3,00
8,00
4,00
1,00
2,00
Sig.
17
22
28
25
26
26
26
25
25
,0000
1,000
2,9091
4,0000
,089
4,0000
4,8800
4,9615
5,0385
5,0769
,098
4,8800
4,9615
5,0385
5,0769
5,2000
5,4800
,800
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 23,976.
Turkey HSDa
